"Without government, who will defend us?" This is perhaps the most common objection to stateless society—and one of the easiest to answer. Voluntary societies can defend themselves far more effectively than states can, for reasons both economic and strategic. This page explains why stateless defense is not only possible but superior to state militarism.
The key insight: the best defense strategy is avoiding conflict in the first place. Anarchist societies excel at this because they remove the perverse incentives that make states aggressively violent. When defense is truly defensive—protecting actual people and property rather than political interests—it becomes both more effective and far less costly.
The most important factor in decisions about war is cost-benefit analysis. If a potential war provides little benefit to decision-makers and costs them significantly, it's unlikely to happen. States, however, have deeply perverse incentives that make them prone to aggression.
These incentives explain why states engage in endless wars despite overwhelming costs in lives, wealth, and stability. The people making decisions don't bear the consequences—so they make terrible decisions.
Stateless societies flip these incentives entirely. Those who would choose war must fund it themselves, making aggression far less attractive.
While stateless societies are unlikely targets, it would be naive to assume they'll never face threats. The solution is making aggression as costly as possible for would-be invaders—without creating a standing army that itself becomes a threat to freedom.
Instead of a single military hierarchy, stateless societies would have multiple competing protection agencies, armed citizens, and voluntary militia. This decentralization makes conquest extremely difficult:
Protection agencies and market entities can make invasion economically ruinous:
This approach—targeting leadership while offering peaceful alternatives to soldiers—creates powerful disincentives for war while maintaining ethical high ground.
Protection agencies, already skilled at apprehending people, would be well-positioned to credibly threaten or execute strikes against aggressor leadership. When politicians know their heads are on the line—not just soldiers' and taxpayers'—they're far less likely to order invasions.
This isn't about glorifying violence. It's about shifting risk back to decision-makers where it belongs. States make war cheap for leaders and expensive for everyone else. Voluntary defense makes it expensive for leaders and cheaper for everyone else.
These aren't just theoretical ideas. History provides evidence that stateless or minimally-armed societies can persist peacefully:
Stateless societies eliminate many ideological triggers for conflict. Without a government to engage in disputes with foreign states, there's no entity to offend or challenge foreign powers. Individual hostility is far less threatening to states than government hostility. Additionally, the obvious injustice of attacking a peaceful, non-threatening society undermines the aggressor's legitimacy.
Technically yes—but they could also nuke other states, and would have more reason to do so. Nuking a stateless region offers no strategic gain, creates environmental damage that affects the aggressor, and would be seen as monstrously unjust by the aggressor's own population, destroying internal legitimacy. The same logic applies to any overwhelming force: using it against peaceful, non-threatening populations is politically costly even for tyrants.
Competition doesn't mean conflict. Agencies that gain reputations for starting fights lose customers. Those that resolve disputes peacefully and protect clients effectively gain market share. The incentive structure favors cooperation and arbitration, not warfare. See Beyond State Solutions for more on how competing agencies resolve disputes.
Coordination emerges voluntarily when needed. Protection agencies have strong incentives to cooperate against external threats—all their business depends on successfully defending their territory. Historical examples show voluntary coordination works: medieval Iceland's thing system, Swiss cantonal militias, and countless examples of voluntary collective defense throughout history. The difference is voluntary cooperation vs. forced hierarchy.
Stateless societies face drastically lower defense needs than states. They're less likely to be attacked, and when threatened, decentralized defense is more effective than centralized militaries. The market provides superior protection services because providers must satisfy customers to survive—unlike state militaries that face no competition and serve political rather than defensive purposes.
In effect, the defense problem largely solves itself when the state apparatus is dissolved. The incentives for aggression disappear, the perverse motivations that fuel war vanish, and what remains is genuine defensive capability based on voluntary cooperation and market efficiency.
Should invasion occur despite these factors, competing protection services and market entities would respond effectively—not because of centralized command, but because defending their customers is literally their business model. When compared to the bloated, inefficient, politically-captured defense establishments of states, voluntary defense is both more ethical and more effective.
Curious why even successful stateless societies eventually fell to state power? Read Downfall of the Greats for historical analysis.
Want to see other voluntary alternatives to state services? Return to Beyond State Solutions.
Ready to build the alternative? Visit The Agora to participate in the counter-economy today.